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SUMMARY
A typical innovation-to-commercialization process for the development of
a new hot section gas turbine material requires one to two decades with attend-
ant costs in the tens of millions of dollars. This transfer process is exam-
ined to determine the potential rate-controlling steps for introduction of
future low strategic metal content alloys or processes. Case studies are used
to highlight the barriers to commercialization as well as to identify the means
by which these barriers can be surmounted. The opportunities for continuingjoint government-university-industry partnerships in planning and conducting
strategic materials R&D programs are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The development of new jet (gas turbine) engines for aircraft is an ex-
tremely costly and competitive business. Billions of dollars were spent and
risked (ref. 1) by Pratt &Whitney Aircraft and the General Electric Company,
for example, in the development of engines for wide-body aircraft. This "high-
risk" industry is, however, critical to the current economic strength of the
United States, since aerospace products are major export items, usually second
only to agricultural products in making positive contributions to U. S. balance
of trade. The nation's defense is also strongly dependent on the existence of
high performance gas turbine engines for tactical as well as strategic
aircraft.
The United States still holds a commanding lead in world qas turbine tech-
nology, but this lead is dependent on a continued flow of advanced technologies -
materials. aerodynamics, cooling, instrumentation, etc. For example, in
order to meet the multitude of material requirements demanded by the hot,
corrosive, and high stress turbine applications, many metallic elements must
be combined in the correct proportions to achieve high temperature superalloys.
Some typical superalloy compositions are shown in figure 1. As can be seen in
this figure, cobalt is a major alloying element in the nickel-base superalloys
that are used for the disks, blades, vanes and combustors in aircraft gas tur-
bine engines. Superalloys consume the major fraction (fig. 2) of U. S. cobalt
imports - the U. S. imports more than 90 percent of its cobalt. In addition,
the U. S. imports most of its highly refined chromium, tantalum, columbium, as
well. All of these are key ingredients in high temperature superalloys. Often
the sources of our imports are neither secure nor elastic to changes in demand
(refs. 2 and 3).
Because of the "cobalt crisis" in 1978-1980 where cost sharply increased
when the availability decreased, a flurry of strategic materials research
activity was initiated by industry and government agencies. Faced with a po-
tential cobalt shortage and high cobalt prices, industry (when possible) sub-
stituted established, "on-the-shelf" low/no cobalt containing materials for
their high cobalt containing counterparts. This was accomplished particularly
" effectively in the magnet industry where ferrite magnets readily replaced su-
marium cobalt magnets. The aerospace industry was rapidly able to reduce co-
balt consumption a modest amount by processing changes such as use of hot die
forging to near-net-shape to replace conventional forging and by substitution
of alternate, fully demonstrated low/no cobalt containing alloys (e.g., IN-718
for Waspaloy). In general, government responses included assessment of the
options including stock-piling, expanded exploration, incentives to mining of
lower grade ores, etc.
A longer range, more fundamental approach to this strategic materials
problem was taken by NASA. Based on recommendations by the Gas Turbine Panel
of ASTM/ASME/MPC(The American Society for Testing Materials/American Society
for Mechanical Engineers/Metals Property Council), a NASAresearch program was
initiated aimed, in part, at developing an improved understanding of the roles
that cobalt, chromium, columbium, and tantalum play in the metallurgy, proper-
ties, and processing of nickel base superalloys (refs. 2 and 4 to 6). Longer
term research efforts seek further reductions through advanced processing con-
cepts and possible elimination of such elements through the identification of
alternate materials. Early results from the initial phases of this program -
called COSAM(Conservation of Strategic Aerospace Materials) - indicate that
at least 50 percent and possibly all of the cobalt can be removed from many
current nickel base superalloys used in gas turbine engines with little impact
on mechanical properties and environmental resistance. More detailed property
evaluation and fabrication efforts are underway or are still needed to confirm
these findings.
Expected problems that could be faced in transferring such laboratory
findings to actual hardware will be discussed in this paper. Case studies
involving transfer of similar technologies - but perhaps more difficult than
the alloying element substitution efforts - will be used to illustrate and
discuss the rate-controlling steps involved. The roles that industry, univer-
sities, and government may have in such a transfer process will also be
discussed.
BARRIERSTO TECHNOLOGYTRANSFER
In the case of new materials for use in gas turbine engines, the transfer
of a researcher's idea through laboratory proof-of-concept to actual applica-
tion can involve a time consuming, expensive process. Someof the barriers
that retard this process are represented in figure 3 as a wall which must be
climbed in order to reach the final application. In our model these "barriers"
combine to determine the height of the wall in terms of the technical effort,
cost, and time to reach the final application.
Well-defined need (component objective). - There must be clearly defined
needs for a new material product or process as indicated in figure 3. In
general, such needs have always been clearly articulated in the gas turbine
industry. Such engine needs include increasedperformancevia higher operating
temperature,increaseddurability,reducedfuel consumption,and cost reduc-
tion. Conservationof strategicmaterialsrecently loomedas a dominantneed
when cobalt,columbium,and tantalumprices skyrocketedas supplieddwindled.
However,more recently,the economic downturnhas now substantiallyreduced
this crisis situationand returned it to the level of a long term chronic
problem.
Fundin9. - Once a need is established,the overridingbarrier is the
availabilityof funding. If the potentialpayoff of a new material,process,
or conceptis judged to be significant,then time and money may be made avail-
able for technologicalinvestment. One distinguishingfeature that often adds
to the height of our wall in figure 3 is the frequentneed to obtain funding
from multiple sources. For example, in additionto the need for internalcor-
porate supportand funds, it is often necessaryto establishcost sharingef-
forts betweengovernmentand industry,or joint venturetype arrangements
betweendifferentindustrialorganizations. As a consequence,multiple source
funding results in chronologicalfragmentation. For example,governmentagen-
cies and/or industrymay fund laboratoryfeasibilitystudiesof a new material.
Governmentagencies (such as NSF or NASA) may fund the early developmentand
characterizationeffortsand the DOD may supportthe manufacturingtechnology
costs. And frequentlythere are time gaps betweensuch effortsdue to various
organizationalbudget schedulesand procurementrequirements. In fact, concen-
trated and commercialization-orientedfundingby industryof a high risk tech-
nologymay not occur until the componenttesting stage. Such complexitiesin
the technologyfunding arrangementsobviouslycan easily result in fundingand
effort disruptionsand slippage,leadingto increasesin time and/or monetary
costs for the development. In the limit, such disruptionscan result in pro-
gram termination,despitetechnicalmerit and promise. Some times such promis-
ing but terminatedconcepts are eventuallypicked up by a competingnation
that is able to build on all the prior U.S. efforts.
Technologyachievement.- For materials,other considerationsin the
"barrierwall'_include technicalachievementcomparedwith competingmaterials.
This barriernot only includesexceedingthe currentstate-of-the-art,but
also includesconsiderationof other new materialsunder developmentand thus
representsa moving target. Usuallyeven the same organizationmay sponsor,
with equal priority,two or more alternativesto answerthe same need. This
is not unlike the approachpracticedin the personalcomputersindustry (ref. 7).
In addition,the end-userperiodicallyalters the intialobjectiveas a conse-
quence of preliminaryresultsfrom competingdevelopmentsor as a result of
new market demands.
Timeliness.- Being able to move a developmentalong on schedule is criti-
cal to being in a position to be fully ready to meet the specificneeds of the
engine applicationwhen the final selectionsare made.
Independentverification.- Confirmationof laboratoryfindingsrepresents
a formidabletechnologybarrier. Often, processscale-upto large scale heats
resultsin material propertiesthat are below those achieved in the more ideal-
ly controlledlaboratoryscale processes. Additionaleffort must be expended
to understandand remedy these deficiencies. Realizationof the potentialof
a new material or processmust be demonstratedon a practicalbasis - this
usuallymeans establishingone or two vendorsqualifiedto make the material
to specificationson a reproduciblebasis.
Manufacturability.- Materialadvancesmay necessitatemodificationof
productionfabricationequipmentor even the purchaseof new equipment. New
materialscan requiremodifiedmachiningmethods, alternatequalitycontrol
techniques,etc.
Componentreliability.- Manufacturedprototypecomponentsmust undergo
extensivetesting and evaluationto demonstratethe competitiveedge of a new
material or concept.
Designer and user acceptance.- New, unfamiliarmaterialscan involvethe
need to make substantialcomponentdesign changes as well as changes in the
way a componentis designed. Thus, there can be considerableiterationbetween
design and componenttest before the designerdevelopsenough confidenceto
incorporatethe material in an engine. User acceptancecan only occur when
the system'sreliability,performanceand cost are firmly under control.
System reliability.- Overall system safety and reliabilityalong with
frequencyof overhaulare barriersthat must be addressedin the transfer
process.
Entrepreneurship.- The barriersjust describedrepresenta complex system
that must be overcome in the transferof technology. An intangiblecoordina-
tion contributionfrom an entrepreneurin the materialsdevelopmentareas may
well also be criticalto the successor failureof the technologytransfer.
Gas turbineor jet enginemanufacturersproduce,or more to the point, design,
assemble,and sell engines. They usuallydo not producethe initialalloys or
process them. Dependingon the article,the enginemanufacturermay not even
investmentcast or machineto final shape. Consequently,besidesthe engine
assemblycomponent,there is an alloy productionand refiningcomponentof the
industry,a metal workingand formingcomponent,and a shape finishingcompon-
ent (ref. 8). As a rule, the various individualcompaniesare independentof
each other. Thus, an entrepreneurialperson is also needed to shepherdestab-
lishmentof a new technologyin these varioussupportorganizations.
There is littledoubt that all the problemsassociatedwith the cross-
transferof scienceand technology,includingcoordinationof efforts,continu-
ity of obtainingfunds, and communicationsassociatedwith diverse institutions
exists in the gas turbine industry.
THE TECHNOLOGYTRANSFERPROCESS
The progressof a new alloy or a processconceptto commercialmaturity
can be likenedto climbing a ladderto surmountour technologytransfer barrier
wall (fig. 4). Each rung on this "technologytransfer ladder"representsa
science,technology,and/or developmenttask that more or less has to be com-
pleted before ascendingto the next one. The natureof each task, the number
of tasks, and their order depend on the particulartechnology. For super-
alloys, in general,the beginningcan be a conceptfor, say, introducinganoth-
er class of strengtheningparticlesin a new alloy (see followingcase
studies),the developmentof thermal barriercoatings,or the replacementof
cobalt in superalloyswith a less import-sensitiveelement. The concepts or
ideas need not be new, but these can be cross-transferredfrom anothermateri-
als technologythroughknowledgegained from the literatureor from personal
contacts. The importantpoint is that the "climbing"processcan be less slip-
pery if the innovationis in answer to well-definedneeds and is followinga
structuredplan to reach a productiongoal. The other tasks (fig. 4) basically
correspondin contentto those found in all other materialsor processdevelop-
ment where performance,reliability,and qualityassuranceare important,con-
trollingparameters. The distinguishingdifferencesfor a gas turbinematerial
are the high cost to qualify and certifya new material and the non-integrated
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nature of the gas turbine industry wherein each different engine manufacturer
has developed and/or demonstrated a number of its own component-specific
materials.
To overcome the technology transfer barriers, a systematic program must
be planned and successfully carried out (refs. 9 and i0). Steps involved to
achieve success are suggested by the "technology transfer ladder" in figure 4.
Generally, a researcher draws on a previously established technology base to
build an idea or, in some instances, a new technology base must be established.
Focused research to tailor the concept to a specific end-use need represents
the second step in the development process. Normally, reiterations to optimize
a material and/or process are required followed by extensive property charac-
terization. At this point, a major decision must be made concerning scale-up
from laboratory amounts of materials and small scale processes to production
quantities of materials and manufacturing scale processes. Such scale-up can
produce prototype hardware to complete evaluation. If a go-ahead is reached,
a further major commitment of money is then required. Depending on the success
of this phase of the program, eventual production of flight hardware and field
testing will culminate the technology development efforts.
An example of the magnitude of such an undertaking is given by the single
crystal turbine blade technology transfer effort. This effort has been estima-
ted by Pratt &Whitney Aircraft to have taken 15 years and an investment of at
least $30 million dollars (ref. Ii). This is about 5 to 7 years longer than
the development of a conventional cast alloy and about 2 to 3 times more
expensive.
The individual steps needed to carry a new alloy concept to ground engine
testing will be traced to better illustrate some of the f_ctors involved in
the transfer of high technology materials. Alloy MA6000_ which is under
development for advanced high temperature turbine blade application will be
used as an example. The process for transfer of this alloy is currently in
its final stages and should provide a good but perhaps conservative illustra-
tion of the problems impeding the progression of research alloys with low stra-
tegic metal content into flight hardware. The following can be viewed as a
more difficult transfer problem since it is expected that the low strategic
content alloys will cast, machine, and generally behave much like their
predecessors.
CASESTUDY- MA6000
Technical Achievements
The objective for what is now known as alloy MA 6000 was to develop a
higher temperature, high strength nickel-base superalloy via the powder metal-
lurgy route for turbine blade applications (refs. 12 to 15). Two key complica-
ting factors were (I) processing by both mechanical alloying to achieve unique
alloy compositions followed by gradient annealing to obtain a directionally
recrystallized structure as compared with directionally solidified cast alloys,
and (2) strengthening by both y' precipitation and an oxide dispersion
(ODS-oxide dispersion strengthening) versus gammaprime only strengthening in
1MA6000 - Trademark of International Nickel Co. (INCO).
cast alloys. The ultimategoal, if fully developed,was to allow higher opera-
ting temperatureswhile minimizingor eliminatingcoolingair penalties in
aircraftgas turbineengines. Reduced use of cooling air can result in sub-
stantialreductionsin specificfuel consumption(SFC). Figure 5 illustrates
the relativelycomplexprocessingsteps which are used to produceMA 6000.
Special attentionis drawn to the mechanicallyalloyingconcept using the high
' energy mill and developmentof a directionalstructurein the final processing
step via use of a gradientannealingheat treatment.
Figure 6(a) is a very high magnification,transmissionelectronmicroscopy
view (ref. 16) of the new MA 6000 superalloy. The black dots are inert oxide
dispersoidsthat are stableto very high temperatures. The more or less squar-
ish particles(fig. 6(b)), are the so-calledcoherent y' and these have been
used to strengthensuperalloysat low and intermediatetemperaturesfor 30
years. The innovationhere is the marriage of both types of particlesin the
same system as well as the eliminationof transversegrain boundariesthrough
directionalrecrystallization(fig. 6(c)). The materialpropertybenefits are
reflectedin an alloy that behaves like high strengthsuperalloysat low and
intermediatetemperatures,but its heat resistantstrengthdoes not fall off
at the higher temperaturesas do the strengthsof the conventionalsuperalloys.
TechnologyBase
It was not possibleto quantitativelycharacterizethe costs, time, and
technicalachievementsthat went into establishingthe extensivetechnology
base for MA 6000. The cornerstonefor MA 6000's developmentwas the invention
of the mechanicalalloying(MA) concept by Benjaminand its applicationto the
developmentof simple nickel/chromiumalloys such as MA 753, 754, adn 755
(ref. 17). In additionto this technicalachievement,the entrepreneurshipof
Benjaminand INCO (InternationalNickel Co.) plus that of Glasgowof NASA Lewis
and Ewing of AVCO (now at DDA) must be viewed as intangiblefactorsthat led
to the advanceof this alloy from one showinglaboratorypromiseto one nearing
demonstrationof commercialpotential.
TechnologyTransferHistory
Figure 7 shows the complicatedextent of a number of sequentialand over-
lappingprojects involvedin the developmentof MA 6000. (Duringdevelopment,
the alloy was designatedMA 6000E.) A key decision in the initialdevelopment
processwas made after evaluatingthe heat treatingresponseof four prelimin-
ary experimentalcompositions. It was decidedto sacrificesome possiblehigh
temperaturesolid solutionstrengtheningby loweringthe refractorymetal con-
tent of the alloy so as to gain the advantageof a wide temperature"window"
for the gradientannealingheat treatment.
Alloy characterizationfollowed the initialalloy developmentand included
determinationof mechanical,environmental,and physicalpropertiesof MA 6000.
Figure8 is just a partiallistingof the multitudeand often expensivealloy
characterizationtasks for MA 6000 (ref. 13). Many laboratorytests are needed
to simulatethe complexstress-temperaturenvironmentmissionsrequired of
jet enginematerials. These tasks are typicalof superalloydevelopmentpro-
grams and slow down the prompt transferof a high potentiallaboratoryalloy
to commercialservicesince many long real time tests are necessaryto provide
a base for designerconfidence.
University-basedscientificresearchusuallyplays an inexpensive/cost-
effectiverole in using scienceto help minimize the developmenttimes of high
technologymaterials. Columbia Universitywas involvedin this capacitywith
respectto MA 6000. Questionson the relativeroles of the differenttypes of
particles,of the matrix itself,and of unintentionalinclusionswere answered
through systematiccreep experiments(refs. 16, 18, and 19). The answerspro-
vided feedback for furthermechanicalalloy design. In similarstudies,the
concernover the view that oxide dispersionstrengthenedalloyshave inherently
low ductilitywas addressed. This issue was studiedand it was concludedthat
low ductilityis not a genericproblemwith mechanicalalloys (ref. 18). It
was also found that despite low ductility,notchesdo not weaken the high tem-
perature static propertiesof MA 6000 and that under cyclic (dynamic)loading
conditions,MA 6000 can indeedbe superiorto the more ductileconventional
superalloys. Scale-up and characterizationof the alloy, as also indicatedin
figure 7, expandedthe scope of MA 6000 developmentprogramand involvedthe
independentevaluationof a number of end-userswithin the engine manufacturing
industry (ref. 14).
Currentactivitiesin the transferprocessare twofold. A NASA funded
contract is under way at TRW to direct forge MA 6000 into a turbineblade con-
figuration (NAS3-22507). A secondmajor NASA contract is under way at Garrett
to carry MA 6000 blades into actual engine testing (NAS3-20073). The latter
effort is part of NASA'sMATE Programwhich has as its objectivethe accelera-
ted determinationof readinessof promisingbut higher risk technologiesfor
commercialgas turbineengines. The objectivesof the Garrettprogramare
shown in figure 9(a), and the currentschedulefor completionis listed in
figure 9(b). The primaryobjectiveis to determinethe potentialof MA 6000
via engine test of prototypeblades such as shown in figure 10. The successful
completionof this phase of the transferprocesswould constitutea major mile-
stone toward the commercializationof MA 6000 for engine hardware. Another
importantpoint is that based on such governmentand universityinvolvement,
recent increasesin INCO'sinternalfundinglevelsfor MA 6000 have been made
availableand MA 6000 is now being developedat INCO by means of an internal
venturegroup (INCOMAP),which oversees developmentand production,but is
independentof existingoperatingprofit centers. This venturetype organiza-
tional scheme allowsmore monies to be reinvestedinto furtherdevelopments
than is ordinarilypracticedby normal profit centers.
MA 6000 Transfer Barriers
Given a brief historyof the technicaldevelopmentof MA 6000, we will
now examinesome of the barriershighlightedin figure 3. Focusedresearchon
optimizationof the compositionof MA 6000 began in 1974. Currentplans call
for the MA 6000 MATE Blade Projectto continuethroughmid-1984,a period of
about 11 years. If engine testing is successfulin this program, it is estima-
ted that at least 5 more years will be required to fully scale-up this material
and gain flight hardwareexperiencebefore the alloy can be consideredto have
transferredfrom a laboratoryconceptto full commericalturbineblade applica-
tion. This representsa time barrierof about 16 years for the transferof MA
6000. This is about the same time as that taken to transfersingle crystal
airfoiltechnology- both involvednew processtechnologyin additionto a new
alloy conceptand composition.
The estimatedinvestmentprofilefor developmentof a y'/ODS blade alloy
by INCO is shown in figure 11. This profile startswith initialdevelopment
and extendsthroughfocusedresearch supportedjointly by INCO and NASA, to
blades undergoingground engine tests. In figure 11 the estimatedaccumulated
costs for the transferof MA 6000 are shown. At the current level of invest-
ment by INCO in the INCOMAPProjectand by NASA in the MATE Blade Project
(which extendsto 1984), a total cost of at least _5 million will have been
expendedby NASA and INCO alone. And additionalsupportby other organizations
that were investigatingthe potentialof this materialwas made during this
period. In the future additionalexpendituresfor distributedproduction
scale-up,manufacturing,etc., are still required.
The third major barrierto overcomefor successfultransfer is the extent
of the advance in technicalaccomplishmentthat must be achievedby a new alloy
or process. Figure 12 shows the progress in stress-rupturecapabilityof
superalloysover the past 40 years (ref. 20). Alloy MA 6000 offers a substan-
tial advancein use temperatureover those of other alloy developmentsto date.
Alloy DS MAR-M247 (memberof the DS MAR-M200 alloy family),a directionally
solidifiedadvancedblade alloy is used as the referencematerialfor the MATE
Blade Project. MA 6000 exceeds the creep and fatigue propertiesof this alloy
based on laboratorytests. The goal of the MATE Blade Projectis to increase
the temperaturecapabilityof turbine blades by 150° to 200°F comparedwith
MAR-M247. The key to achievingthis goal is to maintainthe advantageshown
in figure 11 in scaled-upheats and in fabricatedcomponents.
We have discussedthe transferhistoryof MA 6000 and the major barriers
to this processwhich includetime, cost, and technicalachievement. Designer
acceptabilitystill must be achievedalong with overcomingother barrierssug-
gested in figure 3. It is estimatedthat about 5 years of full-scaledevelop-
ment will be requiredpast the MATE Blade Projectbefore MA 6000 can reach
productionblades (and possiblevanes) in gas turbineengines. Figure 13 shows
the actual innovationladderfor MA 6000. We had some problems in deciding
where the bottomof the ladder should be. Should it start at about 1965, which
was when Benjaminfirst startedon the long journeyto producethe MA 6000
type alloy,or should it be 1974, which was when NASA startedto fund Benjamin
and co-workersat INCO to design the final alloy compositionthat later became
MA 6000? Even taking this latterdate, it appearsthat about 16 years will
have elapsedand between$10 and $12 million'dollarswill be expendedbefore
the MA 6000 alloy can be expectedto pass throughengine testing and qualify
for mass production.
The step of full-scaledevelopment(fig. 13) lies ahead for MA 6000. The
next sectionwill brieflyconsideronly this step for a second case study.
CASE STUDY - TBC FOR VANE PLATFORMS
Thermalbarriercoatings (TBC),as their name implies,are used to reduce
the metal operatingtemperaturesof air-cooledhigh temperaturemetallic compo-
nents of gas turbineenginesby insulatingthem from the hot combustiongases.
This ceramic-coatinginsulationreducesthe metal temperaturesby 200° to 300°F
less than would be experiencedfor a conventionalair-cooledcomponent(fig. 14(a)).
Lower metal temperatureoffers neitherextendedcomponentlife with constant
levelsof cooling air or allows reductionsin coolingair and increasedeffi-
ciency at constant life. In addition,the TBC's oxidation/corrosionresistance
is generallysuperiorto that of the metal substrate,thus providingadded
environmentalprotection.
Thermal barriercoatingshave gained acceptancein several applications
on static engine componentsand hold promisefor future applicationson rotat-
ing turbine blades,as illustratedin fig. 14(b). Initialeffortsaimed at
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insulatingcoatingsfor both aircraftand rocket engines (i.e.,the X-15, etc.)
eventually led to the use of an early generationof thermal barriercoatings
in gas turbinecombustorliners. The barriersto incorporationwere minimal
here since the coatingwas merely appliedon a static structureto extend life -
it was not "designed"into the combustorperformance/structure.
The use of TBC's on vane platforms(endwalls) for the JTgD engine (unpub-
lished report by K. D. Shebbler and R. A. Grazianiof Pratt & WhitneyAircraft
Group) will be brieflydiscussedas an exampleof a full-scaledevelopment
step in the transferprocess. Despite previousexperiences,there were still
barriersto this phase of technologytransfer. These barrierstook the form
of designeracceptancesince the coatingwould be used to replace costly plat-
form cooling- expensivehole drilling- plus would improveperformancedue to
reduced coolingair injectionrequirements. The coatingswould thus require
componentretro-fitin existingenginesbeing used in the commercialfleet.
Another barrierwould be airlineacceptabilitywhich would depend on retro-fit
cost, pay-backtime, and on any problemsthat might arise in commercial
service. Major tasks undertakenin this project includedcoatingdeposition
processrefinement,design, and conceptcoordination. The performanceimprove-
ment sought (and gained)was a reductionin platformcoolingair by 44 percent
which would lead to more efficientengine operationand estimatedfuel savings
of 0.2 percent. This projectdemonstratedthe feasibilityof applyingthe
technologyof plasma sprayedTBCs to turbinevane platformsin modern high
temperaturecommercialengines. The time and estimatedcost barriersfor this
single step in the technologytransferprocessare shown in figure 15. Despite
the technologybase, even this relativelystraightforwardprojecttook about
3-3/4 years and an investmentof nearly _2 million dollars. This development
concept is currentlybeing slatedfor future builds of advancedgas turbine
engines.
CASE STUDY - AEROSPACESTRATEGICMATERIALS
Strategicmaterialssuch as Cr, Co, Ta, and Cb are critical to the manu-
facture of modern gas turbineengines,as indicatedin figure 16. NASA's COSAM
Programhas as one of its major objectivesthe developmentof the needed under-
standingof the roles of strategicelements in nickel-basesuperalloysso as
to guide either the loweringof strategicelementcontentor their total elimi-
nation by replacementwith nonstrategicelements. Such scientificachievements
would help reduce use of strategicelements and so lower the U. S. dependence
on foreignimportswhich now range from 90 to 100 percentfor Cr, Co, Ta, and
Cb. Resultsof the initialphase of the COSAM Program,which involvedsubsti-
tuting nickelfor cobalt in severalsuperalloys,suggestthat up to 50 percent
and possiblyall of the cobalt can be removedfrom some of these alloys without
degradingmechanicalproperties,as illustratedin figure 17. In addition,
this reductionin cobaltmay result in an improvementin environmentalresist-
ance, as shown in figure 18 (ref. 6). It shouldbe pointedout that, in at-
tempting to minimize the problemswith acceptanceand other technologytransfer
problems,the NASA cobalt projectby initialdesign involvedfrom the onset
the NASALewis ResearchCenter (governmentlaboratory),several universities,
and a superalloyproducer.
Figure 19 suggeststhe follow-onaugmentationthat may be requiredto
transferthe COSAM researchresultsto actual flight hardware. In the case of
modifyingthe compositionof a currentlyused nickel-basesuperalloyto reduce
the strategicelement content, it is anticipatedthat the technologytransfer
will not take as long nor be as costly as developinga new material such as MA
6000. For example,the developmentof MA 6000 involveda major activityaimed
at the processingand manufactureof this alloy. However,with the recent
reducedconsumptionof cobaltworldwidealong with improvedsupply and a drop
in price the impetusfor substitutingfor cobalt has been removed. Therefore,
this technologytransfermay be delayeduntil the need arises. Indications
are that reducingcobaltwill not requireextensivedevelopmentto manufacture
componentsfrom reducedcobalt alloys,but will only require slightmodifica-
tions in casting or working temperaturesand heat treatingconditions. Al-
though these steps representonly a small portionof the overallcost of tech-
nology transfer,they will help to hold down the overallcost. It is estimated
that the transferprocesswill proceedas indicatedin figure 20 (from "Tech-
nologicalAlternatives"). Time to provideflight hardwaremay range from 6 to
7 years at an investmentof $6 to 9 million dollarsdependingon which compo-
nents (blades,vanes, disks, etc.) are selectedfor an augmentationproject.
Since these estimatesreflectcurrent/futuredollar values,the total real
costs are expectedto be considerablyless than those of single crystals and
MA 6000. The times reflectlong real-timetestingrequirementsand normal new
alloy productionscale-upefforts.
In the case of strategicmaterials,an additionalmajor barrierto trans-
fer of laboratorytechnologyis the cyclic behaviorof prices and availability
of specificstrategicmaterials. When demand and prices are high and supplies
become limitedor cut-off,there is a great interestin substitutinglow/no
strategicmetal containingalloys for those in currentuse with high strategic
metal content. However,when strategicmetal prices drop and material is
readilyavailable,then the normal major barriersof cost, technicalachieve-
ment, and timelinessare of prime importanceand conservingstrategicmaterials
is of minimal concern. Hence, the internalcorporateneeds are low and are
reflectedin low need for governmentor universityinvolvement. Funds are
then divertedand effortsare substantiallyreducedor cancelled- until the
next crisis in materialcost and supply develops.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
The COSAMProgram as now constituted focuses in part on basic understand-
ing of the roles of strategic elements in nickel base superalloys so as to
allow reductions through substitution. The transfer of low/no strategic con-
tent superalloy technology faces two extreme scenarios. One is that strategic
materials shortages are cyclic and of short duration in nature and that a free
market system, operated by private enterprise with minimal Federal Government
intervention, has and will continue to meet U. S. industrial needs. The other
perceives the possiblity of a total cut-off of strategic materials and the
need for a federally-supported materials "technology bank" ready for technology
withdrawls in the event of such a cut-off for an extended duration. This paper
has discussed the barriers that exist for the transfer of laboratory-base R&T
concepts to a point of incorporation in hardware production. Technology
achievement/payoff, cost, and time are the primary barriers that must be con-
sidered before embarking on such a technology transfer process. Substitution
of critical alloying elements is projected to require less cost and time than
some of the examples provided here or that could be considered for new alter-
native materials, also be investigated in the COSAMProgram.
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The case studiesselectedfor discussionwere mainly made on the basis of
informationavailableto the authors. Other ongoingdevelopmentsin super-
alloysmay no doubt serve equallywell as case studiesto underscorethe bar-
riers that exist in the science-to-technology-to-commericalizationtransfer
process of hot sectionturbinematerials. In fact, we perceive a need for the
gas turbinematerialscommunityto study these issuesfurther to determinehow
the total cost and total time for transferringlow/no strategicalloys to en-
gine readinesscan be minimized. There is a need to develop plans and formu-
late rationalfundingand coordinationschemesthat will substantiallylower
transferbarriers so as to allow rapid, low cost applicationof this technology
should acute or chronicsupply or price instabilitiesarise.
The many strategicuses of the high temperaturesuperalloysdemand the
long-termplanning,research,and developmentactionsthat may not be consist-
ent with the currenteconomicpoliciesof the industrialprofit centers. Ac-
cordingly,it is imperativeto maintaingovernment/university/industrypartner-
ships to continue to developthe understandingnecessaryto minimize future U. S.
vulnerabilityin the area of strategicmaterials.
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